(The transcript has been edited for brevity and clarity.)

WU China's overreaching influence into politics and societies around the world has been a known reality for quite some time now. But the extent of the China influence is something we've just begun to grapple with, not just in politics, military and business, but also in tech, academia, even sports and entertainment, the list goes on. 

Australia was among the first countries to enact legislation to limit Chinese influence. The US is pushing back against Chinese tech. But perhaps no country is more at threat from China's influence than Taiwan. Chinese President Xi Jinping has made clear his motives. He's not just trying to influence Taiwan. Ultimately, he wants to control it. 

And because of this, Taiwan is a great case to consider China's methods to reshape the global order. 

China's expanding influence is a global issue and this is The Taiwan Take. 

Today we speak with Dr. Jeremy Hung, a researcher who has been looking at how Taiwan is especially vulnerable to Chinese influence and infiltration. We discuss the role of intermediaries or proxy agents in the CCP’s effort - that's Chinese Communist Party - to win over the hearts and minds of the people in Taiwan. And we look at some of the ways these proxy agents may be helping China to influence media, impact politics, and strengthen its control over Taiwan. 

Welcome to the show, Dr. Hung. 

HUNG Hi, pleasure to be here.

WU Dr. Hung, we're both colleagues at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR). So I know a little bit about your research. A few weeks ago you gave this great presentation, you called it “Winning without the use of force: the PRC’s influence towards Taiwan's media and politics.” Can you tell us a little bit about that?

HUNG Yeah, basically because there are many ways for China to exert influence directly or indirectly, I focus more on the indirect part - for example, proxies, and how China uses proxy agents to exert influence to Taiwan society and Taiwan politics.

WU So you talk about the word “proxies.” Now before we get into that because I think we need a definition of that. Can you tell us a bit about your methodology in your research

HUNG In order to understand China's influence towards Taiwan’s politics, I adopt ethnographic research.  So that means I participate in many activities of the political party, directly talking to members, representatives, and even standing members of Central Committee of the Party. And I am personally involved in the circle to collect the data and observe the potential influence from China.

WU So it's something similar to when a journalist gets embedded in a military operation; it allows them to see and hear from the inside what's going on and then analyze it from a third-party perspective.

HUNG Ethnographic research is just part of my research methods. But I think it’s quite unique. Not many people use that in this domain. I mean, to study how China generally impacts Taiwan society.

WU Now one of the most important findings from your previous studies and in your current research is the role of proxy agents. These are intermediaries between the CCP and Taiwan. Taiwanese citizens who act in the interest of China and might even act as mouthpieces on behalf of China. 

In other countries, proxy agents may just be one part of a larger campaign against a foreign state. But in Taiwan, proxy agents are absolutely the key ingredient in China's efforts to infiltrate Taiwan and to shape public opinion. 

HUNG When we talk about China's proxy agent, I think many people would think that it is a negative term and it means that people who are helping China on their own will.
It is true that some of the proxies are willing to help China and they know what they're doing. However, for the majority of China's proxies, some may think it is just business. Some know it is what China wants, but they do not believe it will generate negative impact on Taiwan’s general public. While still some are even forced to help China or it may jeopardize their business.

So the term “proxy agent” meaning is not that precise, since some of them were more like a victim of China's state power

WU So we’re victims, huh? So we're talking about individuals. They don't work for the Chinese government. They don't work for the Taiwan government, but somehow they've become the communication channel for the Chinese government. And sometimes they profit from this too, right?

HUNG Yeah, yeah, that's right.

WU Let's go through some of the categories of proxy agents, Dr. Hung. One of them that you refer to in your research is Taishang, which are Taiwanese businesses in China. Who are these?

HUNG Well, it's a big question. Let me put it in this way; there are about 2 million Taiwanese Taishang in China. 

WU So hang on a minute. That's what? One in ten Taiwan population or maybe Taipei city's population?

HUNG I think most of them are just ordinary businessmen. However, a few may jeopardize Taiwan democracy by letting China's influence spread out into Taiwan society as well as Taiwan politics. 

WU So Dr. Hung, how do you influence a Taishang? So how are they activated?

HUNG First, they make more profit in China, so they will listen to China's official guidelines to promote pro-China arguments or follow their lead to influence. And second, sometimes they are trying to avoid problems, like the NBA incident recently.

WU The National Basketball Association.

HUNG Yes. That kind of incident happens all the time in Taiwan. And so Taishang, they’re afraid of getting involved in such incident. So they will sometimes actively cater to Chinese government. 

WU So they cater to what the Chinese government wants. I think you've mentioned before that the range of industries is really wide: Taiwanese singers, there was a bakery shop 八十五度 - 85 degree bakery shop, and there were other examples where like the NBA incident, China put pressure on the Taishang.

HUNG The reason they do that is because - sometimes they have to, because they want to do business in China. They have to politically follow China's lead. For example, there’s an association called the Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises (全国台湾同胞投资企业联谊会). And the association itself is a social group that established in China. That means they have to follow the guidelines from Chinese officials. In these associations, the superior office will be Taiwan Affair Office, which is also Chinese authority, one of the Chinese authorities.

WU So let me make sure our overseas listeners and those at home who don't know, the Taiwan Affairs Office is actually Chinese government. It's an agency of the Chinese government that deals with Taiwan.

HUNG Yes, indeed. And the Executive Vice President and Secretary General of the Association has always been appointed by the Taiwan Affairs Office. So that means the associations, they have to follow the instructions from Chinese officials. 

WU Now are we sure about that? How do we know?

HUNG You can google it. It's on the internet, 

WU They want to be more economically tied with China. It's the second biggest economy in the world and it's a big market for everyone. Not just Taishang. 
How influential is this association? 

HUNG They are a powerful interest group in Taiwan politics. Not the association is powerful, but the people, the Taishang are powerful. When they go back to Taiwan, they will persuade politicians to change their attitude on certain policies relating to China.
During my research, I cannot find solid evidence. But I found many coincidences, that the policy orientation of particular political party may coincidently be in line with China's interest, and also the association’s interest. 

For example, this new statement issued by these associations and issued by Chinese Taiwan Affairs Office. And then the political parties in Taiwan also issued similar statements. So sometimes we cannot find solid evidence. I have to emphasize on this, but the coincidences, these kinds of coincidences increase.

WU Now, it's funny you should mention that because only very recently, the Wall Street Journal wrote a story about how Chinese government is befriending a lot more US companies in hopes that they will lobby DC, Washington, on China's behalf - most notably in the current dispute with tariffs. So it sounds like this Association of Taiwanese Enterprises, that is in some ways controlled by the Taiwan Affairs Office of China, is kind of acting the same way.

HUNG Yes, it's very similar.

WU Let's go to another category of proxy agents: military veterans. So it's fairly unusual In any other part of the world to see an influence campaign being targeted at military veterans, but because of that Chinese Civil War, when the nationalists and millions fled to Taiwan, there's still a little bit of that bond, at least in that particular area left.

HUNG So they have a comparatively strong attachment to China. And after years of interaction across Taiwan Strait, China noticed it and repeatedly invite Taiwanese veterans to visit China and receive them with hospitality, including hosting them inside the Chinese military base, and were served by acting PLA officials.

WU Dr. Hung, why should anyone want to influence a retired general?

HUNG First, retired generals are opinion leaders in the Taiwanese military. Retired and active Taiwanese generals are tightly bound by the military's small ecosystem. It's relatively easy for retired generals to influence active generals through personal relationships and related military association.

Second, through constant interactions and communication between China and retired Taiwanese military personnel, China creates an image of cross-strait brotherhood. The image of retired Taiwanese military personnel supporting unification is also a good domestic propaganda for China.

WU So you're saying that this image, this perception of a retired general from Taiwan, saying, “Hey, I want to unify,” that's actually good propaganda for the PRC.

HUNG Yes. Even though the idea of unification is different.

WU So they've been invited to golfing parties to parties hosted by the CCP.

HUNG Fortunately we may not need to consider it any longer because our government has regulated these kinds of activities from retired generals recently.

WU So we've talked about Taishang, and let's see, we've talked about military vets. One other proxy agent, before we get to media and social media influence. Dr. Hung, I want to ask you about the grassroots: the village level, the townships, the municipalities, Taiwan's administrative structure. The grassroots are your village chiefs, are your heads at the temples. I mean, these are the people that we see everyday: our friends, our family, our acquaintances.

Why would anyone want to influence this low level?

HUNG During elections, they are a powerful fundraiser, vote brokers, and even endorsers. As a result, it is important for politicians to listen to these social elites or local elites. So for a politician, it’s important for them to check with these people in person and try to fulfill their needs on the issue relating to public affairs as well as private affairs, on a daily basis.

Usually party identification is less important at this level. What is important is for politicians to meet the needs of the social elites, these chiefs of village. Or it would be possible for them to support other candidates in the future election.

WU So what you're saying is that their political career could be on the line if they're not listening to the village chief, the head of the temple.

HUNG Yes, indeed. But of course, for politicians, they can choose to fulfill the needs or not. But every time they do that they have to recalculate the vote they might lose. 

WU So it sounds like that's the way that they can influence an election. So then, how are they influenced? So how are they a proxy agent for the CCP?

HUNG Yeah, usually, China will first invite them to Mainland China. And during the visit, Chinese officials, proxies - no matter is Taiwanese or Chinese, the point is to make friends with them - exchange social media apps such as LINE or WeChat. The point is to establish a connection.

So after that, when those local elites went back to Taiwan, this is when China can send disinformation campaigns or fake news through these channels to these local elites. Some of them will neglect it because they may have thought that is not correct, but some will forward it.

The second part would be to invite these social elites to do business in China. And once you do business in China, you will naturally wish prosperity on cross-strait relations. So that means you will support particular political parties, and that's how they try to exert influence.

WU So it sounds like I will probably take some news item that my village chief gives me much more seriously than if I got it from anyone else because I respect him so much. And it also sounds like if I'm doing business in China, I want to make sure both sides are peaceful.

HUNG Yeah, and in fact, it's nothing wrong to live in a peaceful world, right? But the point is that after that they will continuously to send information, which is the manipulated information, through these channels. 

WU Is there an example of this?

HUNG Yeah, do you remember the research method that I have? So, the reason I know is because I also joined LINE groups they used, so I can see their posts. I remember this one chief of village. In Chinese we say now he is 藍根紅苗; the direct translation would be the “blue roots with red shoots.” That means he is a supporter of a pan-blue coalition before, and now he's also a supporter of Communist Party of China.

WU Now, just for some of our listeners, the pan-blue coalition when we talk about it, it's KMT, it’s New Party, it’s People First Party. Effectively these are parties who see an advantage to economic ties with China, strong economic ties.

HUNG There’s one interesting campaign that China operates that I saw it in an LINE group. During the election, someone will send out the rumor that, if particular party won the elections, the pension - 

WU Pensions for civil servants, teachers, and the military -

HUNG Will be repaid by China. It’s ridiculous at first, but unfortunately, many people, especially for elderly people, they believe it. And so, the word has spread and eventually went on the news.

WU That's amazing because the pension reform in Taiwan, it involves billions of New Taiwan Dollars. And for any country to say, I will pay back your pensions if X political party wins, that's just not common sense nearly, right?

HUNG Yes

WU Which actually is really good, sets us up for what I would like to ask you next, Dr. Hung, about your research, media and social media influenced by the PRC.

So Dr. Hung, for the rest of the interview, let's turn our attention to the role of news media and social media. Just like local elites, neighborhood leaders, certain members of the Taiwanese press have been acting as proxy agents for China. In this role, they help craft a positive image of China and they help sway public opinion and China doesn't hide about this. I mean, earlier this year, they held this huge conference in Shanghai. It was sponsored by the CCP; many Taiwanese media, owners, publishers, senior editors were present. 
Now, before I ask you the questions of how China could have possibly infiltrated our news media, I just want to say that the competition here is fierce in the media environment.

So say you're a Taiwanese press that's been influenced, how do you serve China?

HUNG I think there are different types of media that may help China to shape China's image. The first one is those who have huge business in China. The media of this kind is constantly delivering the modern China, and describing China as a land of opportunities.
The second one is that the media are cautious about upsetting China. The owner may also have business with China. Or they just simply want to attract advertisement from Chinese companies. Taiwanese media owners have occasionally censored negative information about China.

WU So these media owners. We’re talking about those Taishang that you talked about earlier in our conversation, right? They are proxy agents in a way, a mouthpiece of the CCP.

HUNG Yes, they are part of it. And not just the owner. Sometimes the journalists could be helping to shape China's image. Taiwanese journalists are the primary targets of China's United Front work. And sometimes they will face temptation from China in the form of money, gifts, and free travel in China. These may change these journalists’s viewpoints and perspectives relating to China, more or less. Well, at least these journalists just stop writing critical articles attacking China.

WU So when you refer to the United Front, you mean that department agency in the Chinese government that is mandated to carry out CCP goals that forwards the propaganda of the CCP around the world.

HUNG About my research. The point I want to make is how small proxy agents form what we call echo-chamber. If you are a politician, especially a pan-blue coalition politician, the information you receive everyday may have been manipulated by China, because many supporters that surround you are affected by local elites, pro-China media, and cyber warfare units from China. And it's hard for them, the politicians, to judge whose opinion stands for the majority. 

Even though those local elites are minority, their active behavior may generate more influence on these politicians. So it's hard for pan-blue coalition politician to receive other ideas from other supporters outside the echo-chambers.

WU Hopefully they're going to look outside their normal source of media or their normal circle of people, right? And probably with it goes for any political party in Taiwan, not just pan-blue coalition. Regardless of what political party you are, influence operations is influence operation. It may be worse for some than for others, but it's someone else trying to manipulate your actions and your possibly policymaking and democracy.

The biggest echo-chamber is social media, at least certainly it is here in Taiwan. How is social media leveraged by the PRC in its influence operations?

HUNG There are two different types.

One is, of course, participation but usually China will use, for example, cyber warfare units such as 50 Cent Army, the PLA Strategic Support Force, to directly operate disinformation campaigns or fake news. And proxy agents, maybe the PR company, that are hired by Taiwanese business or China behind the curtain.

WU Can you talk a little bit more about the proxy agent part?

HUNG There’s an internet platform called PTT. Many Taiwanese young people like to use it. 

WU I've heard it described as the equivalent of a Reddit.

HUNG PTT itself is very influential. Many journalists like to go to PTT to see if there's an article that may be useful for them to write the news. So this is how proxy works. The PR companies will buy accounts in PTT. Currently, PTT does not accept new registers. So those companies acquired these accounts through transactions. And then the PR company may send someone to post an article. And then because the company also have other accounts, so they will recommend these articles. Then the next step is more like a trap to attract the journalist to read the articles and then to write it in the news.

WU And it doesn't help that like we said earlier, over-competitive media environment in Taiwan, there's no fact-checking or double-sourcing by local journalists who are taking PTT information as facts when it could well be disinformation.

HUNG Yes. The most prominent case will be the Kansai Airport incident.

WU Right. I remember that. That was a big fat storm in Japan. Taiwan was unable to evacuate a lot of its citizens. But then somehow there was some news about the PRC being able to evacuate Taiwanese citizens. 

HUNG Yeah, and the origin of this incident is from PTT. To be more specific, in fact, the source is not from PTT, but after people forward the information you just mentioned. At first, it’s posted in the mainland China for three days. And no one cares. But after one people forwarded that information in PTT, then the news go viral.

WU Because then mainstream media picked up on it. However, that was totally debunked. It was a total fake. Other countries couldn't even get any sort of transportation to help their own citizens. And what happened I think, as you said, was it first began on Weibo in the Mainland, and then -

HUNG And then someone posted in the PTT.

WU And then and because PTT is very influential, so then you have a local journalist seeing it, putting it into also mainstream media and online media.

HUNG And this is how the fake news circulated.

WU And in that particular instance, it ended tragically because one Taiwanese government official actually committed suicide. 

HUNG But in fact, this prominent case is just the tip of the iceberg. There are many, everyday, China or PR company, they fabricate many, as many as they could, fake news or disinformation campaigns, by using different channels and or different methods. This one has been picked up, but there are many others has not. 

It doesn't mean China doesn't promote this kind of disinformation campaign. And the point is only one, one fake news has been circulated and successfully propagated. Then it generates impact on our society. This is just one of them. They are many more. And also many more in the coming years or in the future.

WU So what you're saying is, China can dish out hundreds of disinformation but it only needs one to hit the echo-chamber and affect Taiwanese society.

My goodness. So the different sort of strategies in influence campaign from the PRC is just getting much more complicated. Wow. “Winning without the use of force.” Dr. Hung, I suppose we're running out of time, but a very last question. Where's your research going to take you next? 

HUNG Because this is the early stage of my research, I still need to prove the linkage between Taiwanese proxies and certain particular Taiwanese political parties. There are many coincidences - for example, the Taiwanese proxy agents, their petitions is in line with CCP’s, and also, in the end, the particular political party has the same outcome.
So the next stage for me is to prove the linkage between Taiwanese proxy agents and how they affect our major political parties.

WU Dr. Jeremy Hung, researcher at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research. Thank you so much. 

HUNG Thank you.

WU I’m J.R. Wu. And this has been The Taiwan Take.

This episode is produced and edited by Emily Y. Wu. J.R. Wu is our host. Sam Robbins is our researcher. Production assistance by Allison Chan. We recorded this at INDSR.